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Abstract
Recent increases in basic food prices are severely impacting vulnerable populations worldwide.
Proposed causes such as shortages of grain due to adverse weather, increasing meat consumption in
China and India, conversion of corn to ethanol in the US, and investor speculation on commodity
markets lead to widely differing implications for policy. A lack of clarity about which factors are
responsible reinforces policy inaction. Here, for the first time, we construct a dynamic model that
quantitatively agrees with food prices. The results show that the dominant causes of price increases
are investor speculation and ethanol conversion. Models that just treat supply and demand are
not consistent with the actual price dynamics. The two sharp peaks in 2007/2008 and 2010/2011
are specifically due to investor speculation, while an underlying upward trend is due to increasing
demand from ethanol conversion. The model includes investor trend following as well as shifting
between commodities, equities and bonds to take advantage of increased expected returns. Claims
that speculators cannot influence grain prices are shown to be invalid by direct analysis of price
setting practices of granaries. Both causes of price increase, speculative investment and ethanol
conversion, are promoted by recent regulatory changes—deregulation of the commodity markets,
and policies promoting the conversion of corn to ethanol. Rapid action is needed to reduce the
impacts of the price increases on global hunger.
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I. FOOD PRICES: OVERVIEW
In 2007 and early 2008 the prices of grain, including wheat, corn and rice, rose by over
100%, then fell back to prior levels by late 2008. A similar rapid increase occurred again
in the fall of 2010. These dramatic price changes [1] have resulted in severe impacts on
vulnerable populations worldwide and prompted analyses of their causes [2–65]. Among the
causes discussed are (a) weather, particularly droughts in Australia, (b) increasing demand
for meat in the developing world, especially in China and India, (c) biofuels, especially corn
ethanol in the US and biodiesel in Europe, (d) speculation by investors seeking financial gain
on the commodities markets, (e) currency exchange rates, and (f) linkage between oil and
food prices. Many conceptual characterizations and qualitative discussions of the causes
suggest that multiple factors are important. However, quantitative analysis is necessary
to determine which factors are actually important and which are not. While various efforts
have been made, no analysis thus far has provided a direct description of the price dynamics.
Here we provide a quantitative model of price dynamics demonstrating that only two factors
are central: speculators and corn ethanol. We introduce and analyze a model of financial
speculator price dynamics describing speculative bubbles and crashes. We further show
that the increase in corn to ethanol conversion can account for the underlying price trends
when we exclude speculative bubbles. A model combining both the shock due to increasing
ethanol conversion and speculators quantitatively matches food price dynamics. Our results
imply that changes in regulations of commodity markets that eliminated restrictions on
investments [66–70], and government support for ethanol production [71–74], have played a
direct role in global food price increases.
The analysis of food price changes immediately encounters one of the central controversies
of economics: whether prices are controlled by actual supply and demand, or are affected
by speculators who can cause “artificial” bubbles and panics. Commodity futures markets
were developed to reduce uncertainty by enabling pre-buying or selling at known contract
prices. In recent years “index funds” that enable investors (speculators) to place bets on the
increase of commodity prices across a range of commodities were made possible by market
deregulation [66]. The question arises whether such investors, who do not receive delivery of
the commodity, can affect market prices. One thread in the literature denies the possibility
of speculator effects in commodities [75, 76]. Others affirm a role for speculators in prices
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[2–5, 11–17, 45–47, 67, 77, 78], but there has been no quantitative description of their
effect. The rapid drop in prices in 2008, consistent with bubble/crash dynamics, increased
the conviction that speculation is playing an important role. Still, previous analyses have
been limited by an inability to directly model the role of speculators. This limitation has
also been present in historical studies of commodity prices. For example, analysis of sharp
commodity price increases in the 1970s [79] found that they could not be due to actual
supply and demand. The discrepancy between actual prices and the expected price changes
due to consumption and production was attributed to speculation, but no quantitative
model was provided for its effects. More recently, statistical (Granger) causality tests were
used to determine whether any part of the price increases in 2008 could be attributed to
speculative activity [15, 80, 81]. The results found statistical support for a causal effect, but
the magnitude of the effect cannot be estimated using this technique. A model of investors
with “bounded rational exuberance” in their investment strategies has shown increased price
volatility, but has not been compared with actual price data [82].
Here we introduce a model relating speculation to prices and analyze its price dynamics.
The model describes trend-following behavior and can directly manifest bubble and crash
dynamics. In our model, when prices increase, trend following leads speculators to buy,
contributing to further price increases. If prices decrease, the speculators sell, contributing
to further price declines. Speculator trading is added to a dynamic model of supply and
demand equilibrium. If knowledgeable investors believe supply and demand do not match
(as inferred from available information), there is a countering (Walrasian) force toward
equilibrium prices. When prices are above equilibrium these investors sell, and when below
these investors buy. The interplay of trend following and equilibrium restoring transactions
leads to a variety of behaviors depending on their relative and absolute strengths. For
a sufficiently large speculator volume, trend following causes prices to depart significantly
from equilibrium. Even so, as prices further depart from equilibrium the supply and demand
restoring forces strengthen and eventually reverse the trend, which is then accelerated by the
trend following back toward and even beyond the equilibrium price. The resulting oscillatory
behavior, consisting of departures from equilibrium values and their restoration, matches the
phenomenon of bubble and crash dynamics. The model clarifies that there are regimes in
which speculators have distinct effects on the market behavior, including both stabilizing
and destabilizing the supply and demand equilibrium.
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FIG. 1: Food prices and model simulations - The FAO Food Price Index (blue solid line) [1],
the ethanol supply and demand model (blue dashed line), where dominant supply shocks are due
to the conversion of corn to ethanol so that price changes are proportional to ethanol production
(see Appendix C) and the results of the speculator and ethanol model (red dotted line), that
adds speculator trend following and switching among investment markets, including commodities,
equities and bonds (see Appendices D and E).
We further systematically consider other proposed factors affecting food prices. We pro-
vide quantitative evidence excluding all of them from playing a major role in recent price
changes except corn to ethanol conversion. We show that, aside from the high price peaks,
the underlying trends of increasing food prices match the increases in the rate of ethanol
conversion. We construct a dominant supply shock model of the impact of ethanol con-
version on prices, accurately matching underlying price trends and demonstrating that the
supply and demand equilibrium prices would be relatively constant without the increase in
corn to ethanol conversion. We then combine the effects of speculators and corn to ethanol
conversion into a single model with remarkably good quantitative agreement with the food
price dynamics. Final results are shown in Fig. 1. The unified model captures the way
speculators shift between equities and commodities for maximum projected gains.
In order to complete the picture, and respond to claims that commodity market in-
vestors/traders have no mechanism for influencing actual commodity (spot) market prices
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[76], we interviewed participants in the spot market who state unequivocally that they base
current prices on the futures market [83, 84]. The use of futures prices as a reference enables
speculative bubbles on the futures market to influence actual food prices.
We can then consider how the deviations of food prices from equilibrium impact grain
inventories, and how these in turn influence grain prices. Prices above equilibrium reduce
demand and increase supply leading to accumulation of grain inventories. However, while
prices affect decisions immediately, the very nature of futures contracts is that delivery
occurs after contract maturation. Futures contracts may be bought with maturity horizons
at intervals of three, six, nine and twelve months, or more. The expected time delay is
the characteristic time over which producers and consumers choose to contract for delivery,
reflecting their hedging and planning activities. Interviews of market participants suggest it
can be reasonably estimated to be six months to a year due to both agricultural cycles and
financial planning [85, 86]. When prices are above their equilibrium values, and after this
time delay, inventories would be predicted to increase due to high prices that reduce demand
and increase supply. Thus, our model predicts that price deviations from equilibrium will
be accompanied after a time delay by changes in grain inventories. Figure 2 shows that this
prediction is consistent with empirical data [87]. World grain inventories increased most
rapidly between Sept. 2008 and 2009, one year after the first speculative bubble. (Claims of
decreasing inventories refer to the period before 2008 [88].) Inventories continued to increase,
but less rapidly, one year after the near equilibrium prices of 2009. According to the model,
this period involved a rapid increase in corn use for ethanol production and shifting of food
consumption to other grains, which was a major shock to the agriculture and food system.
The increasing inventories are not consistent with supply and demand reasons for the price
increases in 2010, but are consistent with our model in which the rising prices in 2010 are
due to speculation.
As inventories increase, inventory information will become available after an additional
time delay. This information could influence investors, leading to the kind of Walrasian
selling and buying that would reverse trends and restore equilibrium prices, i.e. cause a crash.
The market reaction for pricing might be delayed further by the time participants take to
react to these signals. Still, this provides an estimate of the duration of speculative bubbles.
Indeed, the time until the peak of the bubbles of approximately 12 months in both 2007-8 and
2010-1 provides a better estimate of time frames than the coarser inventory data does and is
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FIG. 2: Impact of food prices on grain inventories - A deviation of actual prices (solid
blue curve) from equilibrium (dashed blue curve) indicated by the red arrow leads to an increase
in grain inventories (green shaded area) delayed by approximately a year (red to green arrow).
This prediction of the theory is consistent with observed data for 2008/2009. Increasing invento-
ries are counter to supply and demand explanations of the reasons for increasing food prices in
2010. Restoring equilibrium would enable vulnerable populations to afford the accumulating grain
inventories.
consistent with the financial planning timeframes of producers and consumers. This suggests
that investors may only be informed after actual supply and demand discrepancies are
manifest in changing inventories. The existence of a second speculator bubble in 2010 raises
the question of why speculators did not learn from the first crash to avoid such investing.
Speculators, however, profited from the increase as well as lost from the decline and they
may have an expectation that they can successfully time market directional changes, leaving
others with losses (the “greater fool theory”).
The recent increasing inventories also raise humanitarian questions about the current
global food crisis and efforts to address hunger in vulnerable populations in the face of in-
creasing world prices [89–92]. The amount of the increase in inventories—140 million metric
tons (mmt) from Sept 2007 to Sept 2010—is the amount consumed by 440 million individ-
uals in one year. According to our model, the reason much of this grain was not purchased
and eaten is the increase in food prices above equilibrium values due to speculation. This
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unconsumed surplus along with the 580 mmt of grain that was used for ethanol conversion
since 2004 totals 720 mmt of grain, which could otherwise have been eaten by many hungry
individuals. These outcomes are not only ethically disturbing, they are also failures of opti-
mal allocation according to economic principles. The deregulation of commodity markets re-
sulted in non-equilibrium prices that caused a supply and demand disruption/disequilibrium
driving lower consumption and higher production—inventories accumulated while people
who could have afforded the equilibrium prices went hungry. Regulation of markets and
government subsidies to promote corn to ethanol conversion have distorted the existing eco-
nomic allocation by diverting food to energy use. This raised equilibrium prices, increased
energy supply by a small fraction (US corn ethanol accounted for less than 1% of US energy
consumption in 2009 [93]) and reduced grain for food by a much larger one (US corn used for
ethanol production is 4.3% of the total world grain production, even after allowing for the
feed byproduct [87, 94]). The failures of both deregulation and regulation ably demonstrate
that the central issue for policy is not whether to regulate, but how to choose the right
regulations.
Our results have direct implications for understanding the complex dependencies of global
economics and the societal effects of food prices. The flows of capital in global markets can
be traced from the financial crisis through our speculator model. Due to the collapse of the
mortgage market and the stock market crash, investors moved money to the commodities
market. This resulted in boom-bust cycles, including in food and other commodities. In a
separate paper we describe the connection between food prices and the recent social unrest,
violence and government changes in North Africa and the Middle East [95]. Our analysis
extends the dominos of global interdependence from housing, to the stock market, to the
commodities market, to social unrest. Policy discussions should recognize the extent of such
links. Here we focus on the food prices and their causes.
We divide our discussion into three parts: first the role of changes in supply and demand
(Section II), second the impact of speculator investment (Section III), and third the role of
exchange rates and energy costs (Section IV). After the conclusions (Section V), we provide
a summary of prior studies in Appendix A and details about our quantitative models in
Appendices B–E.
7
II. CHANGES IN SUPPLY AND DEMAND
In order to account for the recent observed food price differences, changes in supply and
demand would have to be much larger than normal variation and rapid enough to have
impact over the period of a year. Candidates for the causal factors include weather affect-
ing the supply, increasing consumption of meat and other livestock products in developing
nations causing changes in demand, and the use of corn for ethanol production.
The most common explanation provided by market news interpreters for the 2008 food
price increases was the drought in Australia [96–98]. However, the production of grains in
Australia does not correlate with global production (Fig. 3 A). The Pearson correlation
coefficient of the two time series over the last 20 years is only ρ = 0.17. Other countries
have increases and decreases based upon variable conditions and therefore the changes in
global production are not well described by Australia’s production. The fraction of global
grain production from Australia (circa 1.8% by weight in 2010 [87]) is therefore not sufficient
to be a significant causal factor at the magnitude of influence of recent price changes, even
if it might be at smaller scales and shorter time frames. In particular, the low production
in Australia in 2006 did not coincide with a global production decrease, and in 2007 both
Australia and the world had increases in production (Fig. 3 A). Droughts in Australia, and
global weather conditions more generally, are therefore unable to explain the recent food
price changes.
A widely cited potential longer term cause of increasing prices is a change of diet from
grains to meat and other livestock products, as a result of economic development [101, 102].
Development of China, India, and other countries, comprising more than one-third of the
world population, has created higher food demands as the diet of these countries changes.
Changes in diet might have a large impact on the consumption of feed grains, as the ratio of
animal feed to meat energy content has been estimated to be as high as 4:1, 17:1 and 50:1
for chicken, pork and beef respectively [103]. However, the increasing demand for grain in
China and India has been met by internal production and these countries have not, in recent
years, been major participants in the global grain markets [87]. Indeed, demand growth in
these countries slowed in the years leading up to the food price spike in 2008 [4, 12], and the
countries combined remained net exporters [12, 22]. As shown in Fig. 3 B, their combined
net international export of grains has decreased by 5 mmt, from 7 mmt in 2004 to 2 mmt
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FIG. 3: Analysis of possible causes of food price increases - A: Weather, specifically droughts
in Australia. Comparison of change in world (grey) and Australian (black) grain production relative
to total world production by weight [87]. The correlation is small. B : Emerging markets, specifically
meat consumption in China. Comparison of China and India net grain export (dashed blue) to
the US corn ethanol conversion demand (solid red) and net demand after feed byproduct (dotted
red) [94], and FAO food price index (solid black). Arrows show the maximum difference from their
respective values in 2004. The impact of changes in China and India is much smaller. C : Supply
and demand. Corn price (dashed purple) and global consumption (solid green) along with best fits
of supply and demand model (blue) (see Appendix B) [87]. Price is not well described after 2000.
D : Ethanol production (Fig. 6). US corn used for ethanol production (blue circles) and FAO Food
Price Index (red triangles). Values are normalized to range from 0 to 1 (minimum to maximum)
during the period 1990-2010. Dotted lines are best fits for quadratic growth, with coefficients of
0.0083± 0.0003 and 0.0081± 0.0003 respectively. The 2007/8 bubble was not included in the fit or
normalization of prices [87]. E : Currency conversion: euro-based FAO Food Price Index (dashed
black), euro/dollar exchange (solid blue) [99]. Both have peaks at the same times as the food prices
in dollars. However, food price increases in dollars should result from decreasing exchanges rates.
F : Oil prices. Wheat price (solid blue) and Brent crude oil price (dashed black). The peak in oil
prices follows the peak in wheat prices and so does not cause it [100].
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in 2010 [87]. In contrast, the increase in the amount of corn used for ethanol production is
20 times larger, 95 mmt (if we subtract a feed byproduct of ethanol production [94] it is 13
times larger, 67 mmt). The increase in demand due to corn feed in China, for all purposes
but primarily for hogs (the dominant source of meat), from 2004 to 2010 is 22 mmt, less
than one-quarter of the ethanol demand (one third after feed byproduct). Even this amount
was mostly met by internal production increases. Import and export policies isolate the
Chinese domestic grain market and domestic prices of feed grains do not track global prices,
so only the reduction of net export affects the global market. The impact on global food
prices of changes in feed grain demand due to economic development is therefore negligible
with respect to US demand for corn for ethanol.
The many possible reasons for changes in supply and demand can be considered together
if they result in a surplus or deficit, and this surplus or deficit is the primary reason for
changes in grain inventories. Grain inventories can then be used as an indicator of supply
and demand shocks to construct a quantitative model of prices [104]. However, estimates of
inventories provided by the US Department of Agriculture are not consistent with global food
prices when considered within such a quantitative supply and demand model. In Appendix
B fluctuations in wheat, corn and rice inventories and prices are treated in this way. The
example of corn is shown in Fig. 3 C. The prices change due to either a supply shock or
a demand shock given by the net surplus of a given commodity. Prices shift upwards if
there is a deficit and downwards if there is a surplus. In principle, the model allows a fit
of both the observed price of the commodity and its consumption (or production). Prior to
2000 the main features of price dynamics can be fit by the model, consistent with earlier
studies on the role of supply and demand [105, 106]. However, since 2000, both the price
and consumption values, including the recent large price increases, are not well described.
There are reductions in the inventories around the year 2000, which give rise to significant
price increases according to the model. However, the timing of these model-derived price
increases precedes by three to four years the actual price increases. Also, the model implies
an increase in consumption at that time that does not exist in the consumption data. Among
the reasons for a reduction in reserves in 2000 is a policy change in China to decrease
inventories [8, 107]. Such a policy change would affect reserves but would not describe
market supply and demand. Another reason for the inability for the supply and demand
model to describe prices is the role of speculation in prices that leads to non-equilibrium
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prices and changes in grain inventories as discussed in the next section. The high peaks of
recent price behavior have also suggested to some that the mechanism is a decline of supply
and demand elasticities, i.e. high sensitivity of prices to small variations in supply and
demand quantities [8]. However, for this explanation to be valid, supply and demand shocks
must still correspond to price dynamics, and this connection is not supported in general by
Granger causality analysis [2, 15].
Finally, we consider conversion of corn to ethanol. Only a small fraction of the production
of corn before 2000, corn ethanol consumed a remarkable 40% of US corn crops in 2011 [87],
promoted by US government subsidies based upon the objective of energy independence
[71–74], and advocacy by industry groups [74, 108, 109]. Corn serves a wide variety of
purposes in the food supply system and therefore has impact across the food market [110–
112]. Corn prices also affect the price of other crops due to substitutability at the consumer
end and competition for land at the production end [2]. There have been multiple warnings
of the impact of this conversion on global food prices and world hunger [113–120], and
defensive statements on the part of industry advocates [121, 122]. Among quantitative
studies (Appendix A), ethanol conversion is most often considered to have been the largest
factor in supply and demand models. Absent a model of speculators, ethanol conversion is
sometimes considered the primary cause of price increases overall (Appendix A). However,
ethanol conversion itself cannot describe the dynamics of prices because ethanol production
has been increasing smoothly since 2004. Therefore, it cannot explain the sharp decline
of prices in 2008. We show that ethanol can account for the smoothy rising prices once
the high peaks are accounted for by speculation. Fig. 3 D compares annual corn ethanol
production and food prices. During the period 1999-2010, ignoring the 2007-2008 peak, the
two time series can be well fitted by the same quadratic growth (no linear term is needed).
The quadratic coefficients are 0.0083± 0.0003 for corn ethanol and 0.0081± 0.0003 for food
prices, which are the same within fitting uncertainty. The quality of the fits is outstanding,
with R2 values of 0.986 and 0.989 respectively. The Pearson correlation coefficient of the
food price and ethanol annual time series is ρ = 0.98. The parallel increase of the two time
series since 2004 suggests that corn ethanol is likely to be responsible for the underlying
increase in the cost of food during this period. As shown in Appendix C the relationship
between food prices and corn to ethanol conversion can be obtained by modeling the impact
of corn ethanol production as a dominant shock to the agricultural system. According to
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this model, other supply and demand factors would leave the prices mostly unchanged. Prior
to 1999 corn ethanol production and prices are not correlated because of the small amount
of ethanol production. Price variation during that period must be due to other causes.
III. SPECULATION
The role of speculation in commodity prices has been considered for many years by highly
regarded economists [78, 79]. There is a long history of speculative activity on commodity
markets and regulations were developed to limit its effects [123–125]. Recently, however,
claims have been made that there is no possibility of speculator influence on commodity
prices because investors in the futures market do not receive commodities [75, 76]. We have
investigated this claim by asking individuals who set prices at granaries (the spot market)
and who monitor the prices at the US Department of Agriculture how they determine
the prices at which to buy or sell [83, 84]. They state that spot market prices are set
according to the Chicago Board of Trade futures exchange, assuming that it reflects otherwise
hidden global information, with standard or special increments to incorporate transportation
costs, profits, and when circumstances warrant, slight changes for over- or under-supply at
a particular time in a granary. Thus the futures market serves as the starting point for spot
market prices. The conceptual temporal paradox of assigning current prices based upon
futures is not considered a problem, and this makes sense because grains can be stored for
extended periods.
If commodities futures investors determine their trading based upon supply and demand
news, the use of the futures market to determine spot market prices, discounting storage
costs, would be a self-consistent way of setting equilibrium prices [126–128]. But if investors
are ineffective in considering news or are not motivated by supply and demand considera-
tions, deviations from equilibrium and speculative bubbles are possible. When prices depart
from equilibrium, accumulation or depletion of inventories may result in an equilibrium
restoring force. This impact is, however, delayed by market mechanisms. Since producers
and consumers generally hedge their sales and purchases through the futures market, trans-
actions at a particular date may immediately impact food prices and decisions to sell and
buy, but impact delivery of grains at a later time when contracts mature. The primary
financial consequences of a deviation of prices from equilibrium do not lead to equilibrium-
12
restoring forces. Producers, consumers and speculators each have gains and losses relative
to the equilibrium price, depending on the timing of their transactions, but the equilibrium
price is not identified by the market. Profits (losses) are made by speculators who own
futures contracts as long as futures prices are increasing (decreasing), and by producers as
long as the prices are above (below) equilibrium. When prices are above equilibrium con-
sumers incur higher costs which may reduce demand. Producers may increase production
due to higher expected sales prices. The result of this reduction and increase is an expected
increase in inventories after a time delay: an agricultural or financial planning cycle, which
may be estimated to be six months to a year [85, 86]. Finally, the feedback between in-
creased inventories and price corrections requires investors to change their purchases. First
the information about increased inventories must become available. Even with information
about increasing inventories, the existence of high futures prices can be interpreted as a sig-
nal of increased future demand, further delaying market equilibration. Speculatively driven
bubbles can thus be expected to have a natural duration of a year or longer (see Fig. 4).
(We note that it is possible to relate trend following speculators to the “supply of storage”
concept in which current inventories increase due to higher expected future prices [129, 130].
However, in doing so we encounter paradoxes of recursive logic, see Appendix D.)
We review the empirical evidence for the role of speculation in food prices, which includes
the timing of the food price spikes relative to the global financial crisis, the synchrony of
food price spikes with other commodities that do not share supply and demand factors, the
existence of large upwards and downwards movement of prices consistent with the expecta-
tions of a bubble and bust cycle, statistical causality analysis of food prices increasing with
commodity speculator activity, and an inability to account for the dynamics of prices with
supply and demand equations despite many economic analyses. We add to these an explicit
model of speculator dynamics which quantitatively fits the price dynamics.
The mechanisms of speculator-driven food price increases can be understood from an
analysis of the global consequences of the financial crisis. This analysis connects the bursting
of the US real estate market bubble and the financial crisis of 2007-2008 to the global food
price increases [131, 132]. Figure 4 shows the behavior of the mortgage market (housing
prices), stock market (S&P 500), and several commodities: wheat, corn, silver, oil, and
the FAO food price index. The increase in food prices coincided with the financial crisis
and followed the decline of the housing and stock markets. An economic crisis would be
13
expected to result in a decrease in commodity prices due to a drop in demand from lower
overall economic activity. The observed counterintuitive increase in commodity prices can
be understood from the behavior expected of investors in the aftermath of the collapse of
the mortgage and stock markets: shifting assets to alternative investments, particularly the
commodity futures market [133–135]. This creates a context for intermittent bubbles, where
the prices increase due to the artificial demand of investment, and then crash due to their
inconsistency with actual supply and demand, only to be followed by another increase at the
next upward fluctuation. The absence of learning behavior can be explained either by the
“greater fool theory,” whereby professionals assume they can move their assets before the
crash and leave losses to less skilled investors, or by the hypothesis that traders are active
for just one price cycle, and that the next cycle will see new traders in the market. Even
without a quantitative analysis, it is common to attribute rapid drops in prices to bubble
and crash dynamics because the rapid upwards and downward movements are difficult to
reconcile with normal fundamental supply and demand factors [2, 136, 137].
In addition to the timing of the peak in food prices after the stock market crash, the coin-
cidence of peaks in unrelated commodities including food, precious and base metals, and oil
indicates that speculation played a major role in the overall increase [138]. An explanation
of the food price peaks in 2008 and 2011 based upon supply and demand must not only
include an explanation of the rise in prices of multiple grains, including wheat, corn and
rice, but must separately account for the rise in silver, oil and other prices. In contrast,
speculator-driven commodity bubbles would coincide after the financial crisis because of the
synchronous movement of capital from the housing and stock markets to the commodity
markets. Moreover, the current dominant form of speculator investment in commodity mar-
kets is in index funds [77], which do not differentiate the behavior of different commodities,
as they are aggregate bets on the overall commodity market price behavior. Such investor
activity acts in the same direction across all commodities, without regard to their distinct
supply and demand conditions. The relative extent to which each type of commodity is
affected depends on the weighting factors of their representation in index fund investing
activity compared to the inherent supply and demand related market activity.
Recently, the growth of commodity investment activity has been studied in relation to
commodity prices [2, 15, 78, 80]. Since index fund investments are almost exclusively bets
on price increases (i.e. “long” rather than “short” investments), the investment activity is
14
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FIG. 4: Time dependence of different investment markets - Markets that experienced rapid
declines, “the bursting of a bubble,” between 2004 and 2011. Houses (yellow) [142], stocks (green)
[143], agricultural products (wheat in blue, corn in orange) [87], silver (grey) [100], food (red)
[1] and oil (black) [100]. Vertical bands correspond to periods of food riots and the major social
protests called the “Arab Spring” [95]. Values are normalized from 0 to 1, minimum and maximum
values respectively, during the period up to 2010.
an indication of pressure for price increases. Increases in measures of investment have been
found to precede the increases in prices in a time series (Granger) causality analysis [15, 80].
(An OECD study claiming that speculation played no role [139, 140], has been discounted
due to invalid statistical methods [141].) Granger causality tests also show the influence of
futures prices on spot market prices [81]. The causality analysis results provide statistical
evidence of a role of speculative activity in commodity prices. However, they do not provide
quantitative estimates of the magnitude of the influence.
For many analyses, the absence of a manifest change in supply and demand that can ac-
count for the large changes in prices is considered strong evidence of the role of speculators.
As we described in the previous section, supply and demand analyses of grain prices do not
account for the observed dynamics of price behavior. None of the causes considered, indi-
vidually or in combination, have been found to be sufficient. Appendix A reviews multiple
efforts which have not been able to fit the changes in food prices to fundamental causes. As
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with analyses of commodity price changes in relation to supply and demand in the 1970s,
such an absence is evidence of the role of speculators [79].
In Appendix D we construct a quantitative model of speculator activity in the commodity
futures market by directly considering the role of trend-following investor dynamics. Trend
following results in an increase in investment when prices are rising, and a decrease when
prices are declining. Our results describe bubble and crash dynamics when certain relation-
ships hold between the amount of speculative investment activity and the elasticity of supply
and demand. The resulting price oscillations can be modified by investors switching between
markets to seek the largest investment gains. We use the model of speculators to describe
their impact on the food price index. When we include trend following, market switching
behaviors, and the supply and demand effects of changes in corn to ethanol conversion, the
results, shown in Fig. 1, provide a remarkably good fit of the food price dynamics (Ap-
pendix E). We find the timescale of speculative bubbles to be 11.8 months, consistent with
annual financial planning cycles and the maturation of futures contracts for delivery [85, 86].
While there have been no such direct models that match observed price dynamics, trend
following has been analyzed theoretically as a mechanism that can undermine fundamental
price equilibrium [144, 145], and is a central component of actual investing: advisors to com-
modity investors provide trend-following software and market investment advice based upon
“technical analysis” of time series [146]. Such market investment advice does not consider
weather or other fundamental causes. Instead it evaluates trends of market prices and their
prediction using time series pattern analysis. Trend following is also the core of the recently
proposed formalization of “bounded rational exuberance” [82].
We note that our analysis of the effect of commodity investments on the food price
index aggregates the impact of speculator investment across multiple grains. However, it
is enlightening to consider the impact on the rice price dynamics in particular. The direct
impact of speculators on rice is small because rice is not included in the primary commodity
index funds, as it is not much traded on the US exchanges. Instead, the price of rice is
indirectly affected by the prices of wheat and corn, especially in India where wheat and rice
can be substituted for each other. A sharp price peak in rice occurred only in 2008 (there is
no peak in 2010) and this peak can be directly attributed to the global reaction to India’s
decision, in the face of rising wheat prices, to stop rice exports [2, 13, 147]. The observation
that rice did not have the behavior of other grains is consistent with and reinforces our
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conclusions about the importance of speculators in the price of corn and wheat, and thus
food overall.
IV. ADDITIONAL FACTORS: EXCHANGE RATES AND ENERGY COSTS
Two additional factors have been proposed to have a causal role in food prices: currency
exchange and energy prices.
Dollar to euro conversion rates are, at times, correlated to commodity prices [2, 104].
During these periods an increase in commodity prices coincides with an increase in euro value
relative to the dollar. It has been suggested that the reason that food prices increased in
dollars is because commodities might be priced primarily in euros, which would cause prices
to rise in dollars. This has been challenged on a mechanistic level due to the dominance of
dollars as a common currency around the world and the importance of the Chicago futures
market (CBOE) [148]. However, more directly, such a causal explanation is not sufficient,
since the prices of commodities in euros have peaks at the same times as those in dollars, as
shown in Fig. 3 E. Since the US is a major grain exporter, a decline in the dollar would give
rise to a decrease in global grain prices. (The effect is augmented by non-US grain exports
that are tied to the dollar, and moderated by supply and demand corrections, but these
effects leave the direction of price changes the same.) The opposite is observed. Moreover,
the exchange rate also experienced a third peak in 2009, between the two food price peaks in
2008 and 2011. There is no food price peak either in euros or dollars in 2009. This suggests
that the correlation between food prices and exchange rates is not fundamental but instead
may result from similar causal factors.
Some researchers have suggested that increasing energy prices might have contributed to
the food prices [5, 22, 114, 148]. This perspective is motivated by three observations: the
similarity of oil price peaks to the food price peaks; the direct role of energy costs in food
production and transportation; and the possibility that higher energy prices might increase
demand for ethanol. Careful scrutiny, however, suggests that energy costs cannot account
for food price changes. First, the peak of oil prices occurred after the peak in wheat prices
in 2008, as shown in Fig. 3 F. Second, US wheat farm operating costs, including direct
energy costs and indirect energy costs in fertilizer, increased from $1.78 per bushel in 2004
to $3.04 per bushel in 2008 [149]. The increase of $1.26, while substantial, does not account
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for the $4.42 change in farmer sales price. More specifically, the cost of fertilizers was about
5% the total value of wheat (the value of the global fertilizer market was $46 billion in
2007 [150], 15% of which was used for wheat [151]; the value of the global wheat market
was $125 billion [87, 100]). Third, the demand from ethanol conversion (Fig. 3 D) has
increased smoothly over this period and does not track the oil price (see Fig. 3 F and Fig.
4). The connection between oil prices and food prices is therefore not the primary cause
of the increase in food prices. Indeed, the increased costs of energy for producers can be
seen to be an additional effect of speculators on commodity prices. As shown in Figure 4, a
large number of unrelated commodities, including silver and other metals, have a sharp peak
in 2008. Given that some of the commodities displayed cannot be linked to each other by
supply and demand consideration (i.e. they are not complements or substitutes, and do not
have supply chain overlaps), the similarity in price behavior can be explained by the impact
of speculators on all commodities. Metal and agricultural commodity prices behave similarly
to the energy commodities with which they are indexed [141]. It might be supposed that
the increased cost of energy should be considered responsible for a portion of the increase in
food prices. However, since the increases in production cost are not as large as the increases
in sales price, the increase in producer profits eliminate the necessity for cost pass-through.
The impact of these cost increases would not be so much directly on prices, but rather would
moderate the tendency of producers to increase production in view of the increased profits.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
A parsimonious explanation that accounts for food price change dynamics over the past
seven years can be based upon only two factors: speculation and corn to ethanol conver-
sion. We can attribute the sharp peaks in 2007/2008 and 2010/2011 to speculation, and
the underlying upward trend to biofuels. The impact of changes in all other factors is small
enough to be neglected in comparison to these effects. Our analysis reinforces the conclu-
sions of some economic studies that suggest that these factors have the largest influence
[2, 152]. Our model provides a direct way to represent speculators, test if they can indeed
be responsible for price effects, and determine the magnitude of those effects. Our back-
ground check of the pricing mechanisms of the spot food price market confirms that futures
prices are the primary price-setting mechanism, and that the duration of commodity bubbles
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is consistent with the delay in supply and demand restoring forces. Despite the artificial
nature of speculation-driven price increases, the commodities futures market is coupled to
actual food prices, and therefore to the ability of vulnerable populations—especially in poor
countries—to buy food [135, 153–156].
Addressing the global food price problem in the short and long term is likely to require
intentional changes in personal and societal actions. Over the longer term many factors
and actions can play a role. Our concern here is for the dramatic price increases in recent
years and the changes in supply and demand and investment activity that drove these
price increases. The immediate implications of our analysis are policy recommendations for
changes in regulations of commodity markets and ethanol production.
The function of commodity futures markets is benefitted by the participation of traders
who increase liquidity and stabilize prices [157, 158]. Just as merchants improve the distri-
bution of commodities in space, traders do so over time. And yet, the existence of traders
has been found to cause market behaviors that are counter to market function, resulting
in regulations including the Commodity Exchange Act of 1936 [159]. Arguments in favor
of deregulation have cited the benefits that traders provide and denied other consequences,
eventually resulting in deregulation by the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000
[66]. Our results demonstrate the nonlinear effects of increased trader participation [160].
Higher than optimal numbers of traders are susceptible to bandwagon effects due to trend
following that increase volatility and cause speculative bubbles [161], exactly counter to
the beneficial stabilizing effects of small numbers of traders. Since intermediate levels of
traders are optimal, regulations are needed and should be guided by an understanding of
market dynamics. These regulations may limit the amount of trading, or more directly
inhibit bandwagon effects by a variety of means. Until a more complete understanding is
available, policymakers concerned with the global food supply should restore traditional
regulations, including the Commodity Exchange Act. Similar issues arise in the behavior
of other markets, including the recent repeal of transaction rules (the uptick rule) that
inhibited bandwagon effects in the stock market [162].
Today, the economics of food production is directly affected by nationally focused pro-
grams subsidizing agricultural production in the US and other developed countries to replace
fossil fuels. These policies impact global supply and demand and reflect local and national
priorities rather than global concerns. Our analysis suggests that there has been a direct
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relationship between the amount of ethanol produced and (equilibrium) food price increases.
Moderating these increases can be achieved by intermediate levels of ethanol production.
Under current conditions, there is a tradeoff between ethanol production and the price of
food for vulnerable populations. Since the ethanol market has been promoted by govern-
ment regulation and subsidy, deregulation may be part of the solution. Alternative solutions
may be considered, but in the short term, a significant decrease in the conversion of corn to
ethanol is warranted.
These policy options run counter to large potential profits for speculators and agricultural
interests, and the appealing cases that have been made for the deregulation of commodity
markets and for the production of ethanol. In the former case, the misleading arguments
in favor of deregulation are not supported by the evidence and our analysis. Similarly,
the influence of economic interests associated with the agricultural industry is reinforced
by since-debunked claims of the role of ethanol conversion in energy security and the en-
vironment [74]. Thus, a very strong social and political effort is necessary to counter the
deregulation of commodities and reverse the growth of ethanol production. A concern for the
distress of vulnerable populations around the world requires actions either of policymakers
or directly of the public and other social and economic institutions.
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Appendix A
Literature Review
The literature on the mechanisms of food price volatility is extensive [163–174]. In this
appendix we summarize a sample of the literature on the causes of the food price crisis of
2007-2008. An earlier summary can be found in Ref. [104]. For each paper, we note which
of several potential factors the authors examine: the change of diet in developing countries,
biofuel conversion, financial speculation in the commodity futures market, the price of crude
oil, and variation in currency exchange rates. We also list other possible causes addressed
in each paper, and specify the timeframe in question, in particular whether it addresses
just the rising prices in 2007/08, includes the subsequent decline and if it also includes the
increase in 2010/11. For each potential factor, we indicate whether the the paper suggests or
determines it to be a cause (“yes” or “no”). We also specify whether the analysis presented
in the paper is quantitative (bold, with asterisk “*”), qualitative (italic), or only a passing
mention (normal). If the paper does not consider a particular factor, that column is left
blank.
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Appendix B
Commodity Prices: A Supply and Demand Model
In this appendix we present a simple model of commodity price formation based on supply
and demand and show that, while the model is in general able to capture trends in prices
before the year 2000, after this date other factors play a central role in determining prices.
Studies of supply-demand relationships for commodities have used two functional forms
to characterize the price-quantity dependence [175]: a linear (constant slope) form [176] and
a log-linear (constant elasticity) form [177, 178]. If quantity demanded (Qd) for a given
commodity is determined by its price (P ), the linear relationship is written as:
Qd(t) = αd − βdP (t) (1)
while the log-linear relationship is written as:
lnQd(t) = lnαd − βd lnP (t) (2)
Even though in empirical studies the choice of functional form is an important decision, it
is generally assumed that there is no a priori reason for selecting either one [179]. A more
general approach is given by the Box-Cox transformation [180],
Qd(t, λ) = αd − βdP (t, λ) (3)
where λ is the parameter of transformation, such that
Qd(t, λ) =
Qd(t)
λ − 1
λ
(4)
P (t, λ) =
P (t)λ − 1
λ
(5)
As λ → 1, Eq. 3 becomes Eq. 1, while as λ → 0, Eq. 3 becomes Eq. 2. Similar equations
hold for supply.
We assume that, at each time step, P (t) changes due to either a supply shock or a demand
shock. In order to identify what kind of shock occurs, we define the surplus, S(t), as the
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FIG. 5: Supply and demand model - For wheat, corn, rice, sugar (left to right and top to
bottom). Price time series of the commodity (dashed purple lines) and global consumption time
series (solid green lines). Blue dotted curves are best fits according to Eq. 7 and Eq. 8 for prices
and consumption, respectively. Annual supply-demand values are from [87], and prices from [100].
Values of the fitting parameters: wheat - λ = 1± 0.01, αd(1982) = 309± 53 and βd = 1.01± 0.13,
corn - λ = 0.94 ± 0.01, αd(1982) = 114 ± 22 and βd = 1.91 ± 0.23, rice - λ = 0.95 ± 0.01,
αd(1982) = 87 ± 77 and βd = 0.64 ± 0.19, sugar - λ = 0.86 ± 0.07, αd(1982) = 26 ± 20 and
βd = 0.31± 0.12.
difference between production and consumption of the commodity at time t. We assume
there is a positive demand shock at time t if the surplus S(t− 1) is negative (shortage), so
that the intercept of the demand curve shifts according to:
αd(t) = αd(t− 1)− S(t− 1) (6)
An analogous argument can be made for a supply shock, with appropriate signs. At each
time step we can therefore estimate both price and quantity at equilibrium:
Pe(t, λ) =
αd(t)− αs(t)
βd + βs
(7)
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Qe(t, λ) =
αd(t)βs + αs(t)βd
βd + βs
(8)
where αs(t) and βs are the intercept and slope of the supply curve, respectively. We use Eq.
7 to fit the price time series of a given commodity P (t), and Eq. 8 to fit its consumption,
Qd(t). The only input into the model is the surplus S(t), and three parameters are used
for fitting the price and consumption: the transformation parameter λ, one slope (either
βd or βs) and the initial value of one of the intercepts (either αd(0) or αs(0)). The other
slope/intercept is determined by setting initial values to empirical data, Pe(0) = P (0) and
Qe(0) = Q(0). Empirical price data was adjusted for the US consumer price index, so that
Pe(t, λ) represents constant prices.
Fig. 5 shows that this simple model is able to capture most features of commodity price
fluctuations for wheat, corn, rice and sugar, but it fails to reproduce the 2006-2008 spike.
Instead, the model predicts price peaks starting from 2000-2002. However, in order to fit
the spike in the price time series, the model creates a jump in demand which does not occur
in the actual data, as demonstrated by the poor fit of the consumption time series. Absent
a mechanism for shifting of price increases by a time delay of 3-4 years, distinct causes of
the supply-demand change in 2000-2002 and price peaks of 2006-2008 are necessary. Policy-
based reductions in reserves are a possible explanation of the changes in 2000-2002 [8, 107].
Appendix D demonstrates that commodity speculation can account for the peaks in 2007-8.
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Appendix C
Corn Ethanol and Food Prices
Currently, the two main uses of corn are livestock feed (consuming 41.4% of the US
supply in 2010), and ethanol production (40.1%) [181]. Other uses include direct human
consumption and the production of oil, sweeteners and starch for use in a wide range of
processed foods. Corn is therefore heavily used as an input for many food sectors, and it
is reasonable to consider the amount of corn used to produce ethanol to have an impact on
food prices [182]. The proportion of corn for ethanol has increased from 6% to its current
value of 40% over the last 10 years.
We begin by assuming a linear dependence of the corn quantity supplied for food use,
Qf (t), on the price of food, P (t), as in the model described in Appendix B with λ = 1,
leading to the equilibrium equations for price and quantity:
P (t) =
αd(t)− αs(t)
βd + βs
(9)
Qf (t) =
αd(t)βs + αs(t)βd
βd + βs
(10)
We now assume that the use of corn for ethanol production, Qx(t), causes a dominant supply
shock for corn used directly and indirectly for food, so that
αs(t) ∼ Qf (t) ∼ Qt(t)−Qx(t) (11)
where Qt(t) is the total amount of corn produced. In this model, a change in price would
then be caused only by supply shocks. This does not imply that the supply and demand
aside from corn ethanol production is static. For example, a growing world population
creates a growing demand, but if this demand is met by a corresponding growing supply
prices need not change. The total quantity demanded at equilibrium would then follow the
shifts of the demand intercept, so that the difference Qt(t)− αd(t) ≈ Qt(t0)− αd(t0) would
not be time dependent. The assumption that ethanol is a dominant shock is equivalent to
the assumption that the price without the ethanol production would be relatively constant.
Substituting in Eq. 9 and dropping the time dependence for the total corn production and
the demand intercept yields
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FIG. 6: Model results - Annual corn used for ethanol production in the US (blue circles) and
the FAO Food Price Index from 1991-2010 (red triangles). Values are normalized to range from
0 (minimum) to 1 (maximum) during this period. Dotted lines are best fits to quadratic growth,
with quadratic coefficients of 0.0083± 0.0003 for corn ethanol and 0.0081± 0.0003 for FAO index.
Goodness of fit is measured with the coefficient of determination, R2 = 0.989 for corn and R2 =
0.986 for food. The 2007-2008 peak was not included in the fit or the normalization of the FAO
index time series.
Qx(t) = (βd + βs)P (t) +Qt − αd (12)
The supply and demand model of Eq. 12 can be considered a quite general first order model
of the food index as a function of many factors, P = P (fi), one of which is the amount of
corn to ethanol conversion. We can perform a Taylor series expansion of such a generalized
function with respect to its dependence on ethanol due to both direct and indirect effects.
Even though the change in corn ethanol production is a large fraction of US corn production,
we can consider an expansion to linear order of its effect on food prices generally. The total
change in price, ∆P , is then written as a sum over partial derivative relative to all factors
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and their change with respect to corn ethanol production:
∆P =
(
dP
dQx
)
Qx =
∑
i
(
∂P
∂fi
)(
∂fi
∂Qx
)
Qx (13)
where the reference price is for Qx = 0. Comparing with the previous equation we see that
this has the same behavior as a supply and demand model with an effective elasticity given
by:
βd + βs =
(∑
i
(
∂P
∂fi
)(
∂fi
∂Qx
))−1
(14)
The approximation that is needed for validity of this expression is that the dominant shock
in the agriculture and food system is due to the corn use for ethanol. The validity of this
assumption may be enhanced by the cancellation of other effects that contribute to both
increases and decreases in prices.
Thus, if the assumptions of the model are correct, the change in quantity of corn ethanol
would be proportional to the change in food price. This implies that the time dependence of
the corn used for ethanol and of the food price index should each have the same functional
form. The existence of an ethanol production byproduct use for feed (distillers grain),
which is a fixed proportion of the corn, does not influence the functional form. We test
this hypothesis in Fig. 6, where we plot both the time dependence of corn ethanol and
the FAO food price index between 1999 and 2010. Values are normalized to range from 0
(minimum) to 1 (maximum) during this period in order to compare the functional forms of
the two curves. If we exclude the 2007-2008 price peak, both curves can be accurately fit
by quadratic growth (R2 values of 0.986 for food prices and 0.989 for ethanol fraction). The
Pearson correlation of the two curves is ρ = 0.98.
This model differs from the supply-demand model described in Appendix B in that here
we consider the total value of the change in ethanol use (i.e. Qx(t)), and not just the surplus
as reflected in reserves. The combination of the large change in food prices and the large
change in the amount of grain used for ethanol production (over 15% of total global corn
production), along with the proportionality we find between the two quantities, is strong
evidence for a causal link between them.
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Appendix D
A Dynamic Model of Speculators
In this appendix we present a simple dynamic model of the role of trend-following spec-
ulators and their ability to cause deviations from equilibrium supply and demand prices. In
Appendix E we will augment the model to incorporate the specific conditions of the com-
modity markets, the demand shock of corn to ethanol conversion from Appendix C, and
investor shifting between markets.
Our model directly describes the possibility of speculators causing price deviations from
equilibrium supply and demand. A progressive departure from equilibrium leads to supply
and demand conditions increasingly countering that deviation. The interplay of these effects
leads to the oscillations of bubble and crash dynamics.
We construct our speculator model starting from a supply and demand one. The price
dynamics based upon supply and demand for a single commodity can be represented by
[183]:
Qd(t) = αd − βdP (t) (15)
Qs(t) = αs + βsP (t) (16)
P (t+ 1) = P (t) + γ0(Qd(t)−Qs(t)) (17)
where Qd(t) is the quantity demanded at time t, Qs(t) is the quantity supplied and P (t) is
the price of the commodity. We assumed a linear relationship between quantity and price,
and we replaced the equilibrium condition, Qe = Qd = Qs, with Eq. 17, the Walrasian
adjustment mechanism [184]: P rises if the demand exceeds supply and vice versa, where γ0
is the strength of the restoring force toward equilibrium. This is equivalent to a single first
order difference equation in P [185],
P (t+ 1) + P (t)(ksd − 1) = kc, (18)
where ksd = γ0(βd + βs) and kc = γ0(αd − αs). This can be solved to give:
P (t) = (P1 − Pe)(1− ksd)t + Pe (19)
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FIG. 7: Dynamics without speculators - Dynamic response of the system to a supply/demand
shock at time t = 0. Top Left : Exponential convergence of P to its equilibrium value. Top Right :
Supply and demand as a function of time. Bottom Left : Price/quantity relationship. Bottom
Right : Dynamic evolution of Qd vs Qs. Value of parameters: ksd = 0.1, kc = 5.
where (P1 − Pe) is the initial deviation from the equilibrium and Pe = P0 = kc/ksd the
equilibrium price. This behavior is summarized in Figure 7, where ksd < 1 and Qd and
Qs are displaced by a small percentage from their equilibrium value at t = 0, in order to
simulate a supply/demand shock. Eq. 19 is similar to the solution of the classic Cobweb
Model [186], with the difference that the term raised to the tth power is proportional to the
ratio of the supply and demand slopes, 1−ksd = −βs/βd, and not to their sum. Therefore, as
in the Cobweb Model, we can have convergence (ksd < 2) or divergence (ksd > 2) depending
on the slope of the linear response of supply and demand to prices.
We now introduce the influence of trend-following speculators. If the price change of the
commodity is positive in the previous time step, speculators are willing to buy a quantity
µ[P (t)−P (t−1)] of commodity, otherwise they sell µ[P (t−1)−P (t)]. The quantity bought
(sold) is added (subtracted) from the term (Qd(t)−Qs(t)) in price setting Eq. 17. The result
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FIG. 8: Dynamics with speculators: ksp < 1 - Dynamic response of the system to a sup-
ply/demand shock at time t = 0. Top Left : Oscillating convergence of P to its equilibrium value.
Top Right : Supply and demand as a function of time. Bottom Left : Price/quantity relationship.
Bottom Right : Dynamic evolution of Qd vs Qs towards Qe.
is a non-homogeneous second order difference equation in P of the type aP (t+ 1) + bP (t) +
cP (t− 1) = g, so that Eq. 18 becomes:
P (t+ 1) + P (t)(ksd − ksp − 1) + P (t− 1)ksp = kc (20)
where ksp = µγ0. The values of the coefficients are given in terms of both the supply and
demand parameters and the speculator response parameter µ. If prices are measured in
units of kc, Eq. 20 can be normalized to:
p(t+ 1) + p(t)(ksd − ksp − 1) + p(t− 1)ksp = 1 (21)
where p(t) = P (t)/kc.
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FIG. 9: Dynamics with speculators: ksp = 1 - Dynamic response of the system to a sup-
ply/demand shock at time t = 0. Top Left : Oscillations of P around its equilibrium value. Top
Right : Supply and demand as a function of time. Bottom Left : Price/quantity relationship. Bot-
tom Right : Dynamic evolution of Qd vs Qs.
Three cases have to be considered, depending on the value of the discriminant
δ = b2 − 4ac. We again consider a small displacement from equilibrium at t = 0, so that
P0 = Pe.
Case 1: δ > 0
If the discriminant is positive, there are two distinct roots for the characteristic equation
of a second order difference equation, and Eq. 20 can be solved to give:
P (t) = δ−1/2(P1 − Pe)(mt1 −mt2) + Pe (22)
where m1,2 = (−b± δ1/2)/2. If both m1 and m2 lie between 0 and 1 in absolute value, then
both mt1 and m
t
2 approach zero, and the solution converges exponentially. Otherwise the
solution exponentially diverges.
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FIG. 10: Dynamics with speculators: ksp > 1 - Dynamic response of the system to a sup-
ply/demand shock at time t = 0. Top Left : Oscillating divergence of P to its equilibrium value.
Top Right : Supply and demand as a function of time. Bottom Left : Price/quantity relationship.
Bottom Right : Dynamic evolution of Qd vs Qs away from Qe.
Case 2: δ = 0
If the discriminant is zero, then there is exactly one real root. The solution in this case
is:
P (t) = (P1 − Pe)(−b/2)t−1t+ Pe (23)
Whether the behavior is convergent or divergent now depends just on the magnitude of b.
However, the likelihood of the roots being exactly equal when dealing with economic data
is extremely small.
Case 3: δ < 0
If the discriminant is negative, the solution to Eq. 20 becomes:
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FIG. 11: Model Phase Diagram - Behavior of the model for different values of its two main
parameters, ksd and ksp. Dark red regions correspond to a divergent behavior according to Eq. 22,
light red to a divergent behavior according to Eq. 24 (see also Fig. 10), light blue to a convergent
behavior (Eq. 24 and Fig. 8), as well as dark blue (Eq. 22). A thin yellow line between the light
blue and light red regions defines a stationary point at ksp = 1 (Eq. 24 and Fig. 9). The region
from point A to point B represents the stabilizing effect of speculators as ksp increases at ksd = 3.
C is the point in the phase space (ksd, ksp) corresponding to the values obtained with the fitting of
food price data (see Fig. 12).
P (t) = (−sign(b))t−1
√
ktsp
P1 − Pe√
ksp
 sin(θt)
sin(θ)
+ Pe (24)
where
θ = arcsin
√√√√1− b2
4ksp
(25)
and sign() is the signum function. The behavior in this case is oscillating, with a period
T = 2pi/θ. Whether P (t) converges to its equilibrium value (as in Fig. 8) or not (as in
Fig. 10) depends on the growth factor ksp. Given the necessary combinations of the four
parameters of the supply-demand relationship (αs, αd, βs, βd), ksp remains the only relevant
parameter. We can distinguish the price dynamics behaviors of the model according to the
values ksp assumes when the discriminant is negative:
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ksp = 0 P (t) decays exponentially to Pe (Figure 7)
ksp < 1 P (t) converges to Pe with damped oscillations (Figure 8)
ksp = 1 P (t) oscillates around Pe (Figure 9)
ksp > 1 P (t) diverges with amplified oscillations (Figure 10)
The behavior of the system is summarized in Fig. 11, where the phase diagram of the
model is plotted as a function of its two main parameters: ksd, the fundamental supply-
demand contribution to price dynamics, and ksp, the speculator contribution. The blue
region on the top left corner is the stable region of the system, where price converges to its
equilibrium value, while the red region around it defines the domain of price divergence.
The difference between the dark blue region and the light blue one is the sign of the
discriminant. When δ is negative (light blue region), we have the damped sinusoidal behavior
shown in Fig. 8; when δ is positive, we can either have the exponential decay shown in Fig.
7 (left-side dark blue triangle in the phase diagram) or a damped oscillating behavior (right-
side dark blue triangle). The two triangles are separated on the x-axis (ksp = 0) by ksd = 1:
in this case in fact, δ = (ksd − 1)2 and whether the behavior is oscillating or monotonic
depends on the sign of the quantity in parentheses. On the other hand, if ksd > 2 the supply
and demand elasticities are too high, δ > 1 and the price diverges (red region).
The question of whether speculators stabilize or destabilize prices has been the subject
of a large body of literature [187], going back to Milton Friedman, who said “People who
argue that speculation is generally destabilizing seldom realize that this is largely equivalent
to saying that speculators lose money, since speculation can be destabilizing in general only
if speculators on average sell when the [commodity] is low in price and buy when it is high.”
[158]. Our simple model provides a quantitative assessment of the role of speculators: if
we follow the arrow on the phase diagram from the x-axis at ksd = 3 and ksp = 0, for
example, we see how increasing the effect of speculators may actually stabilize the system
at first (from point A to point B), but eventually the system leaves the convergent behavior
and becomes unstable again. Therefore a small amount of speculation may help prices to
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converge to their equilibrium value, but if the market power of speculators is too great they
will have a destabilizing effect on the price dynamics. This holds true as long as the model
parameter ksd < 4; otherwise speculators are never able to stabilize the market.
The condition for speculator induced instability of a supply and demand equilibrium,
ksp ≥ 1, can be understood by recognizing that at ksp = 1 the additional speculator activity
motivated by a price change is precisely enough to cause the same price change in the next
period of time. Such momentum of the price is quite reasonably the condition for speculator
induced bubbles and crashes. Supply and demand restoring forces are then responsible for
the extent of the oscillatory behavior.
The concepts of equilibrium and trend following are manifest in trader strategies that are
“fundamental” and “technical” [188]. Fundamental investing relies upon a concept of target
price, the expected value. Investors estimate the target price based on supply and demand
and use it as a guide to buy or sell. Technical investing considers various patterns in the
price time series, the primary of which is the trend of prices itself, which sets direction but
not value, except in relation to that pattern. More generally, in a technical strategy, a shift
by a constant amount of the price time series would not affect investor decisions to buy
or sell. Our model maps these two types of investing behavior onto the first two possible
terms in a series expansion of the equation for price change in terms of the prices at previous
times. These two terms represent respectively the two different types of investing behavior.
The first term has a price difference from a reference (the equilibrium price), and the second
term has the difference of sequential prices in the past. The equilibrium price in the first
term is the average over the expected target price of all fundamental traders. Even with,
or rather because of, a large diversity of individual trader strategies, an aggregation over
them can be expected to leave these two terms dominant. Aggregation incorporates the
multiple tendencies of individuals, and the diversity across individuals. The aggregate over
their decisions has these two primary price impacts.
Finally, we consider the mechanisms by which trend following speculators are related to
rational expectations about future prices and their impact on current prices and inventory. In
the analysis of inventory changes over time in the “supply of storage” model [129, 130], it has
been shown that inventories increase when future prices are expected to rise. The inventory
change is then achieved by a departure of prices from supply and demand equilibrium at
that time. However, this is due to a future supply and demand change. In effect this analysis
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is the basis of all trading that achieves price stability over time due to inventory. Thus, if
there is a seasonal supply of grain, the storage of that grain for future use is motivated by
a difference in the timing of demand, and prices are adjusted to the demand across time.
Given a temporary expected higher demand or lower supply at a time in the future, prices
may be adjusted at the current time to sell less grain in order to keep the grain for the
future.
Trend following reflects the assumption, as indicated in the speculator model, that ex-
trapolation is a valid representation of expected future prices (including the possibility that
the trends represent actual changes in supply and demand). Under these conditions it is
rational to increase prices in order to reserve inventory for the future prices, causing a de-
parture from equilibrium. This increase in price caused by the expected future prices then
leads to a more rapid increase in price. Absent a way to distinguish the increase in price
that is due to the desire to adjust inventory from other increases in price, we now have a
recursive process. This is exactly the problem of recursive logic leading to multiple possible
truths or self-contradicting paradox. Interpreted as a dynamical system, because of itera-
tive rather than synchronous steps, the result is the dynamics of bubble and crash behavior
described above. In particular, the trend following trader assumption of extrapolated trends
predicting future price increases is inherently (globally) irrational due to its recursive ten-
dency toward infinite or zero prices, only moderated by supply and demand traders. This
does not imply that it is not locally rational, i.e. contextually or at a particular time it is a
rational behavior, but any attempt to generalize local to global rationality encounters ana-
lytic problems. The absence of rationality is manifest a posteriori in empirical data by the
occurrence of crashes after bubbles. Our analysis, however, shows that an empirical crash
is not necessary to prove irrationality of trend following because of its inherent paradoxical
nature. Nevertheless, as we found in our model, a limited amount of trend following can
improve market behavior, in essence because trend following has a limited degree of validity
in rational prediction of future prices. We might say that a small amount of an irrational
behavior can contribute to increased rational collective action.
As discussed in Appendix E, using food price data, we find the current world market to
be at point C in the phase diagram. This is a region where the price diverges with amplified
oscillations. In this domain, speculation can strongly destabilize the supply and demand
equilibrium price.
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Appendix E
Food Price Model: Speculators and Ethanol Demand
We construct an explicit model of price dynamics to compare to the food price index.
Since our analysis has eliminated all supply and demand factors except ethanol conversion
as a major shock, and the only other factor of known relevance is speculators, our model is
constructed in order to represent these two effects. We build the simplest possible model of
these two factors, minimizing the number of empirically adjustable parameters, and find a
remarkably good fit between theory and empirical data.
We combine the ethanol model described in Appendix C and the speculator model de-
scribed in Appendix D. We consider only the FAO food price index to characterize the
combined effect on food prices. Because a majority of financial holdings in agricultural fu-
tures markets are now due to commodity index funds [77], it is reasonable to model aggregate
effects of speculators on commodities rather than on individual ones separately. Similarly,
corn ethanol conversion impacts food prices through a number of parallel mechanisms. The
mutual influences of grain prices through substitution and replacement, as well as geograph-
ical heterogeneity of individual countries or regions, require detailed modeling that need not
be done at a first level of representation.
Starting from the supply and demand model with Walrasian adjustment
P (t+ 1) = kc + [1− ksd]P (t) (26)
we include the effects of assuming a dominant ethanol conversion demand shock from Ap-
pendix C. Since the equilibrium price is given by Pe = kc/ksd, we constrain kc to be:
kc(t) = (a+ bt
2)ksd + b(2t+ 1) (27)
where a and b are the coefficients of the corn ethanol model obtained in Appendix C. The
factor (a + bt2) is the time-dependent equilibrium price from the corn ethanol model. The
additional term b(2t + 1) corrects for the lag in update of the dynamic model with respect
to the equilibrium model, causing the dynamic model to track the equilibrium model price
rather than a price that is lower, i.e. lagging in time, during the initial period. This term
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does not substantially affect the overall fit of the speculator and ethanol model.
We incorporate the effect of trend following speculators as in Appendix D by adding a
term ksp[P (t) − P (t − 1)] which interacts with the price dynamics due to the supply and
demand terms. The last step in our construction of the speculator model is to add the
effect of alternative investment markets on the price of the commodity. We assume that
when the price change of an alternative investment is positive in the previous time step,
speculators sell a quantity µi[Pi(t) − Pi(t − 1)] of commodity contracts, where Pi(t) is the
price at time t of investment i and µi < 0, in order to shift part of their capital to the new
market. This sale of commodities competes against the purchase of commodities given by
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FIG. 12: Model Results - Top: Solid line is the monthly FAO Food Price Index between Jan
2004 and Apr 2011. Dashed line is the best fit according to Eq. 28. The effect of speculators
is turned on in the first half of 2007, when the housing bubble collapsed. Values of parameters
are: ksd = 0.098, ksp = 1.29, µequityγ0 = −0.095, µbondsγ0 = −67.9. Bottom: Time series used as
input to the speculator model, S&P500 index (stock market, in blue) and inverse of the US 10-year
Treasury Note Yield (bonds, in black).
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µi[Pi(t− 1)− Pi(t)], representing the maximum profit seeking behavior of speculators who
transfer capital between markets. In summary, Eq. 20 becomes:
P (t+ 1) = kc(t) + [1− ksd]P (t) + ksp[P (t)− P (t− 1)] +
N∑
i=1
ki[Pi(t)− Pi(t− 1)] (28)
where N is the number of alternative investments taken into account, and ki = µiγ0 are
the alternative investment coupling constants. The model has effectively N + 3 fitting
parameters: two deriving from supply and demand considerations (kc and ksd) and N + 1
deriving from trend-following considerations.
In Fig. 12, we show the best fit of this model to the FAO Food Price Index. We start
the fit in 2007, when speculators presumably started moving their investments from the
stock market to other markets, as suggested by the bubble dynamics of Fig. 4. The date
of the start, May 2007, is chosen for best fit. A more gradual increase in investor interest
would be more realistic and represent the data more closely, but the simple model using a
single date for investor interest is sufficient. The alternative markets we consider besides
commodities are equities (using the S&P500 Index time series) and bonds (using the US
10-year treasury note price time series), which have peaks right before and right after the
peak in the commodity time series (top panel of Fig. 12) so that N = 2.
The resulting price curve is constructed directly from the model using only the adjustment
of four model parameters (ksd, ksp, and the two market coupling parameters, k1 and k2) and
the alternative market prices as input. The two large peaks are precisely fit by the model, as
is the intermediate valley and smaller intermediate peak. The stock market plays a key role
in the fit due to a shift of investment capital in 2009 in response to a stock market increase.
The bond market plays a smaller role and the coefficient of coupling between the commodity
and bond markets is small. The parameters that are obtained from the fitting (ksd, ksp) are
shown as point C in Fig. 11. The point lies in the unstable region of the system, with the
caveat that we fit the Food Price Index with Eq. 28 that includes the alternative markets
but we plot the phase diagram for Eq. 20 without those markets.
Our results for the Food Price Index yield parameters that can be compared with ex-
pectations about speculator influence on commodity markets. In particular, the value of
ksp = 1.29 is consistent with a speculator volume that can move prices 30% more than the
price change that is found in the previous time.
41
The value of the supply and demand parameter ksd = 0.098 combines with the speculator
behavior to yield a bubble and crash cycle of 2pi/θ = 23.6 months (see Eq. 25), almost
exactly two years, consistent with a single year of price increases. This corresponds to the
natural assumption of an annual cycle for the maturation of futures contracts for delivery
that impact on actual supply and demand, a financial planning time of a year [85, 86]. The
maturation of such contracts leads to increases in inventories and thus a restoring force
toward supply and demand equilibrium. Furthermore, according to this analysis, we predict
an increase in inventories of grains starting at the peak of the speculative bubble, one year
after the departure from equilibrium prices. As shown in Fig. 2, this is consistent with the
available data on observed inventories of grains [87]. In particular, the inventories increased
from September 2008 to September 2009.
The result that our dynamic speculator model is able to fit the FAO Food Price Index
and that the supply-demand model of Appendix B is not able to do so is consistent with
the hypothesis that speculators played an important role in determining food prices. In
conjunction with the other evidence for speculator involvement (see main text), our quanti-
tative model provides specific evidence not just for a role of speculators, but for the extent
of impact of speculators on the food and other commodity markets.
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